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Summary
Labor market concentration can worsen after a merger takes place, and this heightened concentration
can negatively affect wages. The focus of antitrust analysis, however, has been on the prices of consumer
products, not the wages of laborers. New research indicates that, on average, labor markets are highly
concentrated, and that higher concentration is associated with significantly lower posted wages for new
jobs. This brief uses existing economic tools to develop a model for evaluating labor market
concentration and its effects, to determine if a merger will run the risk of anticompetitively suppressing
wages, employment, and output. Regulators can use this model to apply antitrust principles to labor
markets, as a basis for antitrust enforcement.
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The enforcement of antitrust law is chiefly motivated by the duty to protect
consumer welfare—a charge that is understood practically to mean ensuring that
the prices of consumer products remain competitive after a merger.
The regulatory focus is on evaluating the effects of a
potential decrease in selling side competition. In terms
of buying side competition,1 labor market concentration can worsen after the merger of firms that compete
for the same pool of workers, regardless of whether
they compete in the same product market.2 However, regulators never consider (as a factor in antitrust
analysis) the impacts on wages from heightened labor
market power.
Yet despite this history of price-focused antitrust
enforcement, we can now hear the early rumblings
of a largely unstudied idea growing into an urgent
policy concern.3 This idea is that some mergers may be
unlawful because they injure competition in the labor
market by enabling a post-merger firm to suppress
wages or salaries anticompetitively. Such anticompetitive wage suppression goes hand in hand with the
suppression of employment and output below the
competitive level. The economic ripple effects can be
staggering, and we are only just beginning to understand them.
No court has ever condemned a merger because of
its anticompetitive effects in labor markets. This may
be because it has not been clear how widespread labor
market power truly is, and how much it affects wages.

SUMMARY
• Labor market concentration can worsen after a merger takes
place, and this heightened concentration can negatively affect
wages. The focus of antitrust analysis, however, has been on
the prices of consumer products, not the wages of laborers.
• New research indicates that, on average, labor markets are
highly concentrated, and that higher concentration is associated with significantly lower posted wages for new jobs. On
average, a 10% increase in concentration yields is associated
with a 0.3% to 1.3% decrease in wages. This should have
implications for how regulators think about mergers.
• As with conventional merger analysis, antitrust regulators could
screen for mergers that threaten to increase concentration in
the labor market, and could use calculations of labor market
concentration to determine when any given merger would likely
lead to anticompetitive wage suppression.
• It is not a significant stretch of antitrust principles to think of
consumer welfare as entitling people to a competitive market
in which to sell their labor, just as it entitles them to a competitive market in which to purchase products and services.
Most consumers are also workers, and so when it comes to
protecting consumers, anticompetitive wage effects should
be given the same attention as anticompetitive price effects.
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FIGURE 1 LABOR SHARE OF INCOME, NONFARM BUSINESS SECTOR 1948-2016
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It also may be the result of uncertainty about the mechanisms available
to courts for litigating antitrust cases
grounded in concern over concentrated labor market power. This Issue
Brief will highlight the findings of
several new research papers, which
collectively provide compelling (albeit
early stage) answers to each of these
critical uncertainties.4
In a nutshell, the research indicates that labor market concentration
in the average market (defined below)
is high, and higher concentration is
associated with significantly lower
posted wages for new jobs. Given
high concentration, some mergers
have the potential to significantly
increase labor market power. Increasing labor market concentration has
likely contributed to one widely
observed phenomenon – specifically,
that the share of labor participation
in American Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) has fallen substantially (see
Figure 1).5 Indeed, the markets in
which firms purchase labor are often
significantly more concentrated
than the markets in which they sell
their products.
With this knowledge in hand,
antitrust regulators can use the U.S.
government’s existing Horizontal
Merger Guidelines6 to make a prima
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Note: Shading denotes recession.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity and Costs

A LOCAL PROBLEM,
EVERYWHERE: WAGES FALL
WHEN LABOR MARKET
CONCENTRATION RISES

facie case against a horizontal merger
of firms that, if allowed, could lead
to anticompetitive wage suppression.
Under the consumer welfare principle,
antitrust law is properly directed at
output reducing practices no matter what their source, and there is
certainly no principled reason for
excluding anticompetitive effects in
labor markets.

The term “monopsony” commonly
refers to situations where a few companies dominate hiring in the labor
market.7 Compared to a perfectly
competitive labor market, monopsony
leads to lower employment and lower
wages. All else remaining equal, lower
employment also entails lower production on the output (product) side.

NOTES
E.g., a post-merger firm may have increased market power
over its suppliers or workers. Buy-side merger challenges
are uncommon, and historically they have focused on anticompetitive power over suppliers.
2 To be clear, the term labor market concentration refers to
the concentration that exists among the firms who hire and
employ labor, not to the concentration among the laborers
themselves. For example, two technology companies in a
given labor market can compete over the same computer
engineers and scientists, even if they sell vastly different
products.
1

Council of Economic Advisers, “Labor Market Monopsony:
Trends, Consequences, and Policy Responses,” Issue Brief,
White House, Washington DC, 2016. (CEA)
4 This Issue Brief is based primarily on the following
two papers: Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall
Steinbaum,“Labor Market Concentration,” Working Paper,
2017; and Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, “Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets,” Working Paper,
2018. I also briefly draw on Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu,
Marshall Steinbaum, and Bledi Taska, “Concentration in
US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data,”
3

2

Working Paper, 2018.
See, e.g., David Autor, et al., “Concentrating on the Fall of
the Labor Share,” American Economic Review 107 (2017):
CEA, supra note 2. The data given here indicate that the
labor share of nonfarm income fell from 65% in 1948 to
58% in 2016.
6 See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
merger- review/100819hmg.pdf.
7 The term “monopsony” is used today in labor economics
5
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Ultimately, imperfect competition in
the labor market has the same kind
of depressing effect on production as
we see in cases of imperfect competition in the product market. For the
purpose of a merger review in labor
markets, the most important question is whether a merger is likely to
increase monopsony in a labor market,
thus reducing wages and output.
Answering that question requires
no new tools or methods. We can
measure labor market concentration
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which is what regulators already use for product markets.8 HHI is equal to the sum of
the squares of the market shares of
each firm in the market. In this case,
market shares are based on the share
of job vacancies of all the firms that
post vacancies in that market. HHI
has become conventional in industry
concentration measures and has been
used in the government’s Horizontal
Merger Guidelines for some thirtyfive years.9 The same HHI thresholds
apply to both seller and buyer power.
For example, an HHI above 1,500 is
“moderately concentrated,” an HHI
above 2,500 is “highly concentrated,”
and a merger that increases the HHI
by more than 200 points, leading
to a highly concentrated market, is

“presumed likely to increase market
power.”
To calculate market shares in
geographic and occupational labor
markets, we use data from CareerBuilder.com, the largest online job
board in the United States, matching
millions of workers and firms. The
total number of vacancies on CareerBuilder.com represented 35% of the

total number of vacancies in the U.S.
in January 2011 as counted in the
Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey.10 The occupations we cover
include the most frequent occupations
among CareerBuilder.com vacancies,
plus the top occupations in manufacturing and construction. We calculate
each firm’s vacancy shares—in order
to determine the HHIs of market

FIGURE 2 AVERAGE HHI BY COMMUTING ZONE, BASED ON VACANCY SHARES

Very High
High
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Low
No data

This figure shows the average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by 6-digit SOC occupation code for the labor markets over the period of
2010Q1-2013Q4. The categories we use for the HHI concentration levels are: Low: HHI between 0 and 1500; Moderate: HHI between 1500
and 2500; High: HHI between 2500 and 5000; Very High: HHI between 5000 and 10000. These categories correspond to the DOJ/FTC
guidelines, except that we add the additional distinction between high and very high concentration levels around the 5,000 HHI threshold.
Market shares are defined as the sum of vacancies posted in CareerBuilder.com by a given firm in a given market and year-quarter divided by
total vacancies posted in the website in that market and year-quarter.

NOTES
to refer to both a monopsony proper (i.e., where just one
buyer dominates the market) and to general demand-side
lack of competition, or an oligopsony (i.e., where the number of purchasers of labor is small, but greater than one).
8 On use of the HHI in merger assessment, see Phillip E.
Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶940-932
(4th ed., 2014).
9 The first version of the Merger Guidelines to employ the
HHI was issued in 1982. All versions are maintained by
the federal antitrust enforcement agencies in an archival
website. See https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-

merger-guidelines.
Our results, while fairly general, do not necessarily apply
to the whole US labor market. CareerBuilder.com does not
contain all vacancies in the occupations that are in our
sample. This could lead us to overestimate labor market
concentration.
11 An SOC-6 level occupation is a reference to a list of
“Standard Occupational Classifications” maintained by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupations are assigned
a six-digit code, and the sixth digit is the highest level
of classification. See United States Department of Labor,
10

3

Occupational Employment Statistics (2016), available at
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm.
12 The commuting zones in question were developed by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture and are based on data from
the 2000 Census.
13 See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Commuting Zones and Labor
Market Areas (2012), available at https://www.ers.usda.
gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-marketareas/.
14 Ioana Marinescu and Roland Rathelot, “Mismatch Unemployment and the Geography of Job Search,” American
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FIGURE 3

AVERAGE HHI BY OCCUPATION, BASED ON VACANCY SHARES, FOR THE LARGEST 30 OCCUPATIONS
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concentration—for over 8,000 labor
markets, defined by a combination of
occupation at the SOC-6 level11 and
commuting zone.12
We show that, on average, labor
markets are highly concentrated: the
average HHI is 3,157, which is above
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines’
“highly concentrated” threshold
of 2,500. Concentration varies by

occupation and city, with larger cities being less concentrated. Figure 2
shows a map of all the commuting
zones in the United States colorcoded by the average HHI, based on
vacancy shares. Figure 3 shows the
average HHI by occupation, based on
vacancy shares. With an average HHI
of around 2,000, the occupation that
is least concentrated is “Customer

NOTES
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
Ioana Marinescu and Ronald Wolthoff, “Opening the Black
Box of the Matching Function: The Power of Words,”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
#22508, 2016, available at https://doi.org/10.3386/
w22508.
16 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Unemployed Persons
by Duration of Unemployment,” available at https://www.
bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm (last updated Feb. 2,
2018).
17 Alan B. Krueger and Eric A. Posner, “A Proposal for Protect15

ing Low-Income Workers from Monopsony and Collusion,”
2018 (On file with author).
18 California v. eBay, Inc., 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D.Cal. Aug.
29, 2014).
19 See DOJ, 2007. “United States v. Arizona Hospital and
Healthcare Association.” Complaint. See also DOJ, 2010.
“United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc. et al.” Complaint.

4

service representative.” The most
concentrated occupation is “Farm
equipment mechanic,” with an average
HHI well above 8,000. CareerBuilder,
while being one of the largest online
job boards, does not contain all online
vacancies. Using a dataset from Burning Glass Technologies that covers
essentially all online vacancies, we find
similar results. Across essentially all
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occupations and commuting zones,
the average market has an HHI of
3,953, or the equivalent of 2.5 recruiting employers. In all, 54% of labor
markets are highly concentrated
(above 2,500 HHI) according to the
DOJ/FTC guidelines. Using the
HHI, we can determine the relationship between concentration and the
wages that companies advertise in
their job postings on CareerBuilder.
com. It shows that average posted
wages are strongly and negatively
correlated with labor market concentration as measured by HHI. However, this correlation alone cannot be
counted as strong evidence that higher
concentration depresses wages in a
causal sense, as wages in depressed
labor markets also tend to be lower.
Instead of simply comparing different labor markets, we look at how
changes in concentration within a
given market over time affect wages.
The data indicate that when labor
market concentration increases,
posted wages decrease. Furthermore,
to account for economic conditions
in each specific market, we must
control for the number of job postings divided by the number of job
applications, also called “labor market
tightness” in economic jargon. But
even after controlling for tightness,
the impact of labor market concentration on wages remains negative and
statistically significant. All of these
tests show that the negative effect of
concentration on wages is likely to be
causal and not driven by unaccountable market conditions.
The size of the impact of labor
market concentration on posted wages
depends on the specific statistical
model used, but on average, a 10%

increase in concentration is associated with a 0.3% to 1.3% decrease
in wages. Furthermore, smaller cities
are doubly disadvantaged by having
higher levels of labor market concentration and by suffering more from
any increase in concentration.
The takeaway for antitrust regulators is that it is straightforward,
according to the evidence, to calculate labor market concentration with
vacancy data.

ANTITRUST LAW CAN
LEVEL THE PLAYING
FIELD: DEFINING “LABOR
MARKETS”
How, then, can regulators use this
ability to assess labor market power
when evaluating mergers to determine
whether any given merger would lead
to anticompetitive wage suppression?
The first obstacle in their path is the
challenge of determining a robust definition of a labor market. Based on our
research, we suggest this provisional
definition: commuting zone by 6-digit
Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC) by quarter. This would be, for
example, accountants and auditors in
the Philadelphia commuting zone in
the first quarter of 2011. The justifications for each element of this definition are as follows:
Geography: Markets for many
non-perishable manufactured products
are nationwide or even worldwide,
while service markets tend to be a bit
smaller. Measuring geographic markets for labor, however, can be more
complex. We recommend using the
observed Commuting Zones (CZs)
developed by the USDA, as noted
above. The CZs are based on data from
5

the 2000 Census on commuting patterns across counties to capture local
economies and local labor markets in a
way that is more economically meaningful than county boundaries.13 On
CareerBuilder.com, 81% of job applications occur where the job applicant
and prospective employer are within
the same commuting zone.14
Occupation: The 6-digit SOC
codes can assist in defining markets
by occupational category. Surprisingly,
within a 6-digit SOC occupation, job
postings with higher wages attract
significantly fewer applicants than
jobs with lower wages.15 This negative relationship between wages and
the number of applicants prevails on
average across all 6-digit SOC codes
and is driven by the fact that workers within a 6-digit SOC code can
be very different from each other.
For example, among accountants and
auditors, which is a 6-digit SOC code,
job postings with the title “senior
accountant” pay higher wages and
attract fewer applicants than job postings with the title “junior accountant.”
This shows that, in general, a 6-digit
SOC is likely too broad a definition
of the labor market. However, because
it may underestimate effective labor
market concentration, a 6-digit SOC
is still a good presumptive definition
of a labor market.
Time: The selection of the time
period is particularly important for
the labor market because job seekers can only afford to be unemployed
and looking for a job for a limited
period of time. The median duration
of unemployment is about 10 weeks.16
That is, unemployed job seekers
typically are hired or drop out of the
market within about one quarter. This
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is why it is presumptively sensible to
calculate labor market concentration
over a quarter.
Regulators can thus compute the
HHI for the labor market based on
vacancy shares in the commuting
zone, 6-digit SOC, and quarter, using
data from Burning Glass Technologies
(http://burningglass.com/), EMSI
(http://www.economicmodeling.com/)
or Indeed (https://www.indeed.com/).
Regulators can then use the thresholds from the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines to make a prima facie case
against a merger that significantly
increases labor market concentration
and runs the risk of anticompetitively
suppressing wages or salaries.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A
“HORIZONTAL” LABOR
MARKET MERGER?
The next obstacle involves deciding
which mergers are truly “horizontal.”
Under conventional merger analysis,
a merger is horizontal if the merging
firms are competitors in some relevant
product and geographic market. The
same principle applies to mergers
that threaten to increase concentration in the labor market. Such a
merger is horizontal if the two firms
compete for hiring in the same labor
market, whether or not they compete
for hiring in the product market. A
prima facie case against a merger that
significantly increases labor market
concentration can be made based on
HHI, independently of whether the
merger would also increase concentration in the product market.
One useful way to think of the
extent of horizontal competition in
the market for employees is to look

at the participants in the relatively
large number of “anti-poaching” cases.
Non-poaching agreements are simply
collusion by another name. They occur
when employers agree with each other
not to hire one another’s workers.17
The fact that two companies have
entered into a non-poaching agreement is alone sufficient to suggest that
the employees subject to that agreement constitute a relevant market
and that a merger between the firms
would be anticompetitive.
To illustrate the difference
between collusive groups that involve
products and those that involve labor,
consider eBay, Inc., and Intuit, Inc.18
A federal district court approved
an antitrust settlement in a state’s
federal antitrust challenge to a labor
“non-poaching” agreement between
these firms. Intuit’s principal products
are TurboTax, a popular income tax
preparation program, and Quickbooks, a popular business program
for bookkeeping and accounting. By
contrast, eBay is a popular online auction site, which is not in the business
of producing and selling software.
Looking at the product side, a merger
between eBay and Intuit would very
likely be quickly approved. The firms
appear not to be substantial competitors in any market in which they sell
products or services. Nevertheless, the
two firms found it profitable to agree
with one another not to poach each
other’s “specialized computer engineers and scientists.”
The fact that the two firms found
it profitable to enter into this agreement is a strong indicator that (1)
the firms were competitors in this
particular portion of the labor market and (2) that between the two of
6

them they had enough market power
to make the agreement profitable. As
a result, a merger between eBay and
Intuit should invite very close scrutiny
in this particular section of the labor
market, as should similar cases.19

A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF
“CONSUMER WELFARE”
The final obstacle for consideration
here concerns the future aim of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. While
challenges to mergers affecting the
labor market require some rethinking
of merger policy, they need not alter
any of its fundamentals.
One way to address the case where
monopsony does not affect product
prices is to define the “consumer
welfare” principle in such a way as to
include both monopoly and monopsony. To do this, we need to think
about consumer welfare in terms of
output rather than price. Further, people appear in markets as both product consumers and as sellers of their
labor. As a result, it is not a significant
stretch to think of consumer welfare
as entitling them to a competitive
market in which to sell their labor, just
as it entitles them to a competitive
market in which to purchase products
and services.
Most consumers are also workers,
and so anticompetitive wage effects
should be given the same attention as
anticompetitive price effects. Going
forward, those reviewing mergers
cannot simply assume that lack of
anti-competitive effects in the product market entails the same for the
labor market.
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CONCLUSION
In this Issue Brief, we presented
evidence for monopsony in the US
labor market, showing that labor
market concentration is high, and
increasing concentration is associated with lower wages. We discussed the market definition for

the labor market and argued that
HHIs based on US vacancy data
can be used to make a prima facie
case against a horizontal merger,
while relying purely on the existing Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
We described what constitutes a
“horizontal” merger in the discussion about the widespread use of

7

non-poaching agreements. Finally,
we noted that merger policy does
not need to change fundamentally
in order to review mergers that
threaten to increase labor market
concentration and allow for anticompetitive wage suppression.
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